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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal income taxation of corporate reorganizations is a complex subject,
replete with intricate statutory provisions and influenced by numerous judicial
doctrines. This Comment examines the rules and regulations that govern corporate
reorganizations as defined in setion 368 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the
impact of Proposed Treasury R. gulations t and recent court decisions on those trans-
actions. The purpose of this Comment is to provide a contemporaneous statement
regarding the impact of new developments in the tax field2 on long-standing
assumptions underlying strategic corporate reorganization-structuring by tax practi-
tioners.3 To that end, an analysis of J.E. Seagram v. Commissioner is provided.5
The Tax Court opinion in Seagram combined with the Proposed Treasury Regu-
lations profoundly impacts the continuity of interest doctrine, a significant judicial
prerequisite to successful reorganization of corporate entities.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
This Comment presumes an understanding of basic federal income tax prin-
ciples. This Part elaborates on the basic principles underlying the tax consequences
of acquisitive reorganizations.6
1. On December23,1996, theInternal Revenue Service (Service) published proposed regulations regarding
the continuity of interest requirement for corporate reorganizations. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1(a)-(e), 61 Fed.
Reg. 67514 (1997). Additionally, on January 3, 1997, the Service proposed additional clanges to the corporate
reorganization provisions regarding the continuity of business enterprise requirement. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-
l(d), 1.368-2(a), -(f), -(k), 62 Fed. Reg. 36101 (1997).
2. See infra notes 138-74 and accompanying text (discussing recently published Proposed Regulations).
3. See infra Part I.C (examining various judicial doctrines and decisional law that impacts business
transactions and corporate tax practice).
4. 104 T.C. 75 (1995).
5. See infra Part EIl (analyzing the Seagram opinion).
6. Because the focus of this Comment is on the 1997 Proposed Regulations, the discussion is limited to
the reorganizations to which the regulations apply.
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A. Recognition & Nonrecognition Concepts
Under the American system of taxation, gain from dispositions of property is
specifically included in gross income under section 61(a)(3).7 Appreciation in the
value of property is generally taxed when gain is realized, essentially when that
property is sold or otherwise disposed of.8 Initially, it would appear that any gain
realized from "dealings in property" must be taken into consideration when taxable
income is calculated for the corporate taxpayer.9 Section 1001 requires that a tax-
payer who sells or otherwise disposes of property recognize gain (or loss) to the
extent that what is received by the taxpayer exceeds (or is less than) the taxpayer's
adjusted basis in the property relinquished, unless another provision specifically
provides otherwise.'0 Congress has enacted specific provisions for corporate reor-
ganizations, mandating the nonrecognition of gain (or loss) to all parties to a
reorganization" that exchange property while pursuing a plan of reorganization.12
To illustrate: If Corporation T is acquired by Corporation P, pursuant to a plan
of reorganization, and former shareholders of T exchange all of their Corporation
T stock for Corporation P stock, the capital investment has not been liquidated, but
essentially continues unchanged except in form. This transaction, however, is a
realization event, and any gain would be subject to inclusion under section 1001.
Section 361, however, specifically provides that in the above situation, the gain or
loss shall not be recognized. Notably, this mandatory section applies whenever its
7. LR.C. § 61(a)(3) (1997) (stating that "gross income" includes all income regardless of its source,
including any gain derived from dealings in property). To determine the amount to be included, § 1001 explains
that the amount realized (i.e. money plus fair market value of property other than money received) in excess of the
adjusted basis (generally the cost of the property) is the gain from a disposition of property. Id. § 1001(a),(b); see
i,& § 101 1(a) (defining "adjusted basis" by referencing § 1012's cost basis provision and § 1016's adjustments).
8. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 201-03 (1920) (setting the standard for determining the
taxability of a transaction). In Macomber, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to tax a shareholder on a pro
rata dividend, contending that the dividend did not represent a severable interest in the corporation. Id. at 209-11.
The Court held that the dividend was merely a representation of continued investment in a going concern, and not
an indication of increased wealth. Id.
9. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1997) (including gain from "dealings in property" in the determination of tax
liability).
10. Id. § 1001(c) (1997) (mandating recognition of gain or loss).
11. See id. §§ 354,356 (1997) (containing the relevant provisions). The shareholders or debtholders of the
acquired corporation, under § 354 and § 356 recognize no loss and only recognize gain to the extent property other
than stock or securities is received in the exchange. Id.
12. The phrase "plan of reorganization" has not been statutorily defined. Although the regulations purport
to ensure that nonrecognition status is confined to transactions that are actually related to § 368 reorganizations,
the definition is vague, and to some, easily misconstrued. Notwithstanding the outdated Code provisions, for an
excellent discussion of the concept see, Elliot Manning, "In Pursuance of the Plan of Reorganization": The Scope
of the Reorganization Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARv. L. REv. 881 (1959).
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criteria are met, its applicability is not dependant on taxpayer election. Absent this
provision, an exchange of property for stock would constitute a taxable disposition
of property at fair market value, and any gain would be included in the calculation
of taxable income.13 Therefore, a realizable event must occur before gain becomes
taxable (or losses become deductible); mere appreciation or depreciation in value
is disregarded until such an event has transpired. Once such an event occurs, a
specific Code provision must allow a taxpayer to defer recognition of any realized
gain.
Common with the principles underlying other nonrecognition sections, the
Legislature has decided that the taxpayer's investment remains unliquidated, and
that a mere change in the form of investment is not the proper time to tax any gain
(or deduct any loss).' 4 Before nonrecognition status is extended, however, the trans-
action must conform to the applicable reorganization provision. Unfortunately, even
strict conformity is not sufficient. The Tax Court may subsequently examine the
transaction to determine whether granting such status will effectuate Congressional
intent, or whether the transaction is motivated by a desire to evade or avoid tax
liability. Various judicial doctrines operate to ensure that nonrecognition treatment
effectuates Congressional purpose. 5
B. Definitions of Various Acquisitive Reorganizations
In the world of corporate finance, "reorganization" often refers to the refor-
mation of a previously bankrupt entity into a viable corporation. For tax practi-
tioners, however, the term is defined in Code section 368(a)(1) to include merger,
consolidation, acquisition, and division of corporate entities.16 A transaction must
initially meet one of these statutory definitions to be treated as a reorganization for
tax purposes.
13. See I.RC. § 61(a)(3) (1997) (noting gains from "dealings in property" as an example of items to be
included in gross income).
14. See generally Edward T. Roehner & Shelia M. Roehner, Realization: Administrative Convenience or
Constitutional Requirement?, 8 TAxL. REV. 173 (1953) (comparing the economic theories behind the "realization"
requirement).
15. See discussion infra Part I.C (detailing the substance over form, step-transaction, and continuity
doctrines).
16. LR.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A)-(G) (1997) (illustrating seven different types of corporate business transactions
to which the term "reorganization" applies). These seven transactions can often be structured either as a § 368
reorganization where the parties receive tax-free or partially tax-free treatment. See id. §§ 354, § 356 (requiring
recognition of any gain equal to the cash plus the fair market value of property other than acquirer stock or
securities transferred). Because this Comment addresses newly proposed regulations impacting "A," "B," "C," and
"G" reorganizations explicitly, these provisions are separately defined within the Comment. See discussion infra
Part ll.B.1-5 (specifying the requirements of these reorganization provisions).
264
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1. 368(a)(1)(A)
Under section 368(a)(1), "A" reorganizations are statutory mergers or con-
solidations.1 These are effected under federal or state law"8 when an acquiring
corporation receives the assets of another corporation, the target, in exchange for
assuming the liabilities of the target and exchanging former shareholders' target
stock for stock in the acquiring corporation. A "merger" under section
368(a)(1)(A) involves two or more corporations that combine with only one of the
corporate entities surviving; the other corporation disappears by operation of law.2"
In contrast, in a consolidation, the corporations combine into an entirely new
corporation.
If the target merges into a subsidiary of the parent, the subsidiary receives sub-
stantially all' of target's assets and the target shareholders receive sufficient parent
stock, a "forward triangular merger" results.22 A "reverse triangular merger" is an
"A" reorganization in which a controlled subsidiary merges into the target
corporation where the former target shareholders receive voting stock of the parent
corporation, and the parent corporation acquires control of the target as a result of
the transaction.' If a transaction qualifies as an "A" reorganization, the target cor-
poration, the acquiring corporation, and the former target shareholders in receipt
solely of acquiring corporation stock defer recognition of the resulting tax
consequences.24
17. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1997).
18. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (1986) (dictating that to qualify as a reorganization, the transaction must
satisfy federal, state, territory or District of Columbia corporate law). Every state has provisions for merging or
consolidating corporations; the parties to a reorganization must strictly comply with the state statute to effectuate
an 'W' reorganization. Id.
19. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1997).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368 (1986) (explicating the statutory requirements for these reorganizations).
21. The "substantially all" language was added to prevent a triangular merger from being used to effectuate
a corporate division. See H.R. RE'. No. 1902, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1968), S. REP. No. 1653, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1970). For a detailed discussion of the complexity inherent in the "substantially all" requirement, see
Robert H. Wellen, "More Problems Complicate the Application of 'Substantially All' to Acquisitions, 79 J. TAX'N
366 (1993); see also Philip C. Cook & John L. Coalson, Jr., The "Substantiall All of the Properties" Requirement
in Triangular Reorganizations-A Current Review, 35 TAX LAW. 303 (1982).
22. A forward triangular merger can be effectuated under § 368(a)(1)(A) and § 368(a)(2)(D).
23. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E) (1997). "Control" means ownership of at least 80% of the voting power of the
voting stock and 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock. Id. § 368(c) (1997).
24. The tax consequences to each party following a reorganization:
1. In exchange for its own stock, P recognizes no gain or loss on its receipt of T stock or assets.
I.R.C. § 1032 (1997).
2. If T transfers its assets to P, T generally recognizes no gain or loss on the receipt of P stock
exchanged; if property other than stock or securities is received, no gain or loss will be recognized if
T distributes the other property to its shareholders or debtholders, in pursuit of a plan of reorganization.
I.R.C. § 361(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(3), (c)(3) (1997).
3. T's shareholders recognize no gain or loss if they exchange their T stock for P stock while
pursuing a plan of an "A" reorganization. I.R.C. § 354. (1997) If T's shareholders receive P stock
indirectly through T, such as in a "C" reorganization, the same rules apply. I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1),
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2. 368(a)(1)(B)
"B," or "stock-for-stock," reorganizations enable one corporation to acquire
another corporation as a subsidiary if the consideration transferred directly to target
shareholders consists solely of voting stock' in the acquiring corporation, or its
parent,26 and the acquiring corporation has "control ' 27 of the target corporation im-
mediately following the transaction.2 8 To qualify as a "B" reorganization, no
property other than voting stock in the acquirer may be furnished as consideration
for target stock received by the acquirer in the transaction.2,9
3. 368(a)(1)(C)
Where the acquiring corporation acquires "substantially all"30 of the target's
assets and the consideration consists solely of voting stock in the acquirer, or voting
368(a)(2)(G)(l) (1997).
4. T's shareholders are taxed to the extent they receive property other than P stock and P securities.
A T shareholder in receipt of other property ("boot") is taxed on the fair market value of the property
received or the gain realized in the transaction, whichever is less. I.R.C. § 356(a) (1997). "Boot" is not
defined in the Internal Revenue Code. The term refers to cash or other "non-permitted" property that
triggers recognition when received in an otherwise tax-free exchange.
See BoRis I. BrrlER & JAMES S. EusncE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
13.10 (5th ed. 1987); see also LR.C. § 356(a)(1)(B) (1997) (referencing permitted and nonpermitted property as
it relates to nonrecognized transactions).
25. "Solely" is strictly interpreted. Thus, for example, if the consideration paid by the acquirer is 90% voting
stock and 10% cash, the transaction fails to statutorily qualify as a "B" reorganization. The meaning of "voting
stock," as used in REv. RUL. 72-72, 1972-1 C.B. 104, has been litigated in several cases. See, e.g., Paulsen v.
Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985) (holding that receipt of preferred stock with an exercisable right to receive
additional cash qualified as voting stock, in satisfaction of the statute); Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp.,
315 U.S. 194 (1942) (finding that warrants issued in the transaction are not voting stock). For a complete analysis
of the voting stock requirement see Richard D. Dailey, The Voting Stock Requirement ofB and C Reorganizations,
26 TAX L. REV. 725 (1971).
26. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1997).
27. See id. § 368(c) (1997) (defining "control" as owning at least 80% of the combined voting power of
stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total number of shares of every other class of stock).
28. Id. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1997). Because there cannot be any boot in a "B" reorganization, the requirement
that at least 80% of an acquired corporation's stock must be acquired during the reorganization itself led
practitioners to believe that if a corporation had previously acquired more than 20% of a target's stock, a "B"
reorganization could not be effectuated. In 1954, however, the Code was amended, making it clear that a creeping
acquisition of control can qualify as a valid "B" reorganization. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273
(1954) (changing the operative language of § 368(a)(1)(B)). Several notable articles deal more directly with this
change in tax law. See, e.g., Burton W. Kanter, Cash in a "B" Reorganization: Effect of Cash Purchases on
"Creeping" Reorganization, 19 TAX L. REV. 441 (1964); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Defining the "Acquisition" In
B Reorganizations Through the Step Transaction Doctrine, 67 IOWAL. REV.31 (1981).
29. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1997).
30. Id § 368(a)(1)(C) (1997). For advance ruling purposes, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) has
indicated that "substantially all of the assets" means assets representing at least 90% of the fair market value of the
net assets (assets minus liabilities) and 70% of the fair market value of the gross assets held immediately before the
transfer. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568-69.
McGeorge Law Review / VoL 29
stock and a limited amount of money3 or other section 368(a)(2)(B) property, the
transaction qualifies as a "C," "stock-for-assets" reorganization.32 As an asset
acquisition, it more closely resembles an "A" reorganization than a "B" reorgani-
zation, where solely stock is exchanged, and has been termed a practical "merger."
33
Additionally, an acquirer can assume the liabilities of the target in a "C" reorgani-
zation, or acquire the assets subject to the target's liabilities,34 without violating the
statutory scheme.3"
4. 368(a)(1)(D)
Reorganizations effectuated under section 368(a)(1)(D) may utilize a wide
range of consideration. Thus, property other than the stock of the acquirer may be
given in exchange for the target's property. As defined in the Code, "D" reorgani-
zations are transfers by a corporation of all or part of its assets to a corporation
controlled3 6 by the transferor or its shareholders, if the stock or securities of the
controlled corporation are distributed by the transferor in a transaction that qualifies
under section 354, section 355, or section 356.37 Assuming the requirements of the
Code are met, section 368(a)(1)(D) can be utilized by the transferor itself, its share-
holders, or both to shift assets of the underlying corporation to a controlled
corporation. 8
31. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (1997).
32. IL (allowing the acquirer to transfer money or other property to the target, as long as the acquirer
receives solely voting stock representing at least 80% of the fair market value of all of the target assets). In most
circumstances, however, it is nearly impossible to use nonvoting stock as the consideration for the exchange
because the assumption of the target's liabilities represents more than 20% of the value of the assets, in violation
of the 80% threshold. Since "substantially all" of the assets of the acquired corporation (target) must be obtained
during reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(C), the degree to which assets can be stripped away by the eventual
acquirer prior to reorganizing is limited. This is untrue of reorganizations consummated under § 368(a)(1)(A) or
§ 368(a)(l)(B). Compare I.R.C. § 368(a)(I)(C) (1997) (requiring that "substantially all" of the target's assets be
acquired), with § 368(a)(1)(A) (1997), and § 368(a)(1)(B) (1997) (including no such requirement).
33. See American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194,201 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
34. The target corporation must, however, liquidate. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(G) (1997).
35. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C). There are situations where an insolvent corporation is worth saving, particularly
where there is a demand for the goods or services that the corporation produces. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 377-79 (3d ed. 1986) (illustrating the value of some insolvent corporations).
36. Control is measured immediately after the transfer. See REv. RUL59-222,1959-1 C.B. 80. Additionally,
where creditors are also shareholders of the transferor, courts have found the requisite control to exist.
37. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1997). Reorganizations under "D," therefore, are not acquisitive reorganizations
but rather shifts or divisions of ownership of the corporation's underlying assets.
38. Id.
267
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5. 368(a)(1)(G)
In order to facilitate their rehabilitation as insolvent corporate debtors, defunct
corporations may choose to utilize the tax-free corporate reorganization provisions
in section 368(a)(1)(G).39 Following a bankruptcy or similar event, a corporation
may reorganize by transferring all or a part of its assets to another corporation if,
pursuant to a plan of reorganization, stock or securities of the acquiring corporation
are subsequently distributed in accordance with certain requirements. 40 The
statutory requirements for a"G" reorganization, similar to a "D" reorganization, are
stated in Code sections 355 and 354. The statutes require that the transferee cor-
poration acquire all or substantially all of the insolvent corporation's assets,41 all
property received by the transferor, whether stock, securities, or other property, and
all other transferor property must be distributed pursuant to a plan of reorgani-
41zation.
C. Relevant Judicial Doctrine
Several fundamental principles underlie judicial determination of tax cases.
Although the legislature has extended nonrecognition status to transactions that
readjust the corporate structure, 3 statutory qualification is only the initial hurdle
that a transaction must clear. If a transaction is deemed not to be driven by eco-
nomic considerations, the Internal Revenue Service, and later a court, may
recharacterize the resulting corporate structure, with materially different tax con-
sequences. Thejudicial doctrines of substance over form, step-transaction, business
purpose, and continuity of business enterprise are particularly relevant in the
corporate reorganization context." These doctrines often lead to recharacterization
39. Id. § 368 (a)(1)(G) (1997). For an excellent explication of the economic incentives shareholders of a
nonviable business have to pursue reorganization, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems
Failure Under Chapter)) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANK. LJ.247, 259 (1983) (observing that the owners
have no incentive to cease operation, since their interest disappears after liquidation). But see William L. Cary,
Liquidation of Corporations in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 60 HARV. L. REV. 173, 194 (1946) (positing that
rehabilitation of the debtor does not always reflect the best option when a corporation's business operations are not
economically sound).
40. I.R.C. § 368 (a)(1)(G) (1997); see id. (outlining the parameters of this type of reorganization). Where
a corporation controls an acquiring corporation, the acquiring corporation can acquire a debtor corporation by
effectuating a "triangular" "G" reorganization in exchange for the controlling corporation stock, instead of the
acquiring corporation's stock. Id.
41. Id. §§ 354(b)(1)(A), 355 (1997).
42. Id § 354(b)(2)(B) (1997). The legislative history reveals that "G" reorganizations must also meet the
continuity requirements to qualify for nonrecognition treatment.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1988) (detailing the purposes of excepting certain business transactions from
the general requirement of recognizing gain or loss realized).
44. See infra Part ll.C.1-3 (chronicling the development and imposition of these judicial doctrines within
the corporate reorganization environment).
268
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of transactions and must be taken into consideration when contemplating transfers
of corporate property.
1. The Doctrine of Substance Over Form
Unquestionably, a transaction's form is of great importance. However, the form,
or label, of a transaction is not the equivalent of its substance. 45 Two categories of
this doctrine exist-legal substance over form and economic substance over form.46
Using the legal substance over form doctrine, the court examines the legal rights
and obligations of the parties, and determines whether or not the transaction should
be recharacterized for tax purposes on the grounds that the legal "form" chosen does
not correlate with the substantive results.47 In the economic substance arena, the
court's analysis is based on the premise that particular statutory provisions
intentionally attach certain tax consequences to particular transactions.48 When the
economic consequences justify restructuring the transaction, different legal relation-
ships than those actually created, together with different tax results, may be
imposed by the court.4 9
2. The Step-Transaction Doctrine
The step-transaction doctrine effectively permits the court to "step together,"
or collapse, a series of separate transactions into a single transaction. Thus, while
several steps may be taken by a corporate entity to effectuate a particular result, the
court is not bound by the form those transactions take. Rather, if the court deter-
mines that a series of transactions are interrelated, the focus will be on the ultimate
result, and not the intermediate steps, when determining the tax consequences of the
exchange.50
45. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (stating that the label placed on a
transaction is not determinative); see also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (recharacterizing shares
distributed tax-free in a reorganization as a dividend). But see Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988),
aff'd 886 E2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989) (illustrating the recent reluctance to recharacterize an otherwise statutorily
legitimate transaction and respecting the prearranged stock acquisition).
46. See generally Joseph Isenberg, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859
(1982) (expounding on this vague and amorphous doctrine).
47. Id. at 879-80.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. "he principle of looking through form to substance... is the cornerstone of sound taxation ......
Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750. 755 (5th Cir. 1961). See Marvin A. Chirelstein & Benjamin B. Lopata,
Recent Developments in the Step-Transaction Doctrine, 60 TAXES 970, 970-75 (1982) (explaining the step-
transaction doctrine as it relates to the relationship between substance and form).
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Three variations of the step-transaction doctrine overlay decisions in corporate
reorganization cases. In McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner,52 the court
explained the variations as follows:
The step-transaction doctrine is a particular manifestation of the more
general tax law principle that purely formal distinctions cannot obscure the
substance of a transaction . . [U]nder the "end result test,"
"purportedly separate transactions will be amalgamated with a single
transaction when it appears that they [are] really component parts of a
single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of
reaching the ultimate result."
A second test is the "interdependence" test, which focuses on whether "the
steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created by one trans-
action would have been fruitless without a completion of the [entire] series.
Finally the "binding commitment" test most restricts the application of the
step-transaction doctrine .... The "binding commitment" test forbids use
of the step-transaction doctrine unless... "there [is] a binding
commitment to take the later steps.
53
No clear guidance exists regarding the applicability or appropriateness of these
variations.54 In the context of corporate reorganizations, the anticipation of the
doctrine's role becomes particularly relevant. The recharacterization of a transaction
as merely a step that is a part of an overall plan to take subsequent steps may cause
the transaction to fail nonstatutory requirements 55 with radically different results.
56
51. See, e.g., Security Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing
the "end result," the "interdependence," and the "binding commitment" tests, and concluding that taxpayers could
manipulate the step transaction doctrine by avoiding a formal commitment to dispose of stock received); Redding
v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169,1177 (7th Cir. 1980) (utilizing the interdependence test to determine whether each
transaction would have been effectuated without a completion of every other transaction in the series).
52. 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
53. Id. at 524-25 (citations omitted); see Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1430 (1987) (explaining
the applicability of the interdependence test); see also Security Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1244-45 (discussing the
various tests). Simply stated, if the ultimate objective is to achieve goal X, and to achieve such goal, Y action must
be taken, the interjection of several meaningless transactions between Yaction and Xresult will be ignored, and the
taxpayer will be treated as if only action Ywas taken. ld.
54. See Ronald H. Jensen. Of Fonrm and Substance: TaxFree Incorporations and Other Transactions Under
Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REv. 349, 359-67 (1991) (providing examples of cases incorporating different step-
transaction tests).
55. See infra Part lI.C.4 (discussing the continuity of interest doctrine).
56. Previously, if, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, parent exchanges its stock, and acquires target stock
or target assets, and in accordance with their earlier intention, and the target shareholders sell the parent stock
received in the tax-free transaction for cash, for purposes of determining tax treatment of all of the target share-
holders, the parent, and the target as well, the shareholders are likely to be viewed as not receiving an equity interest
270
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
3. The Business Purpose Doctrine 5 7
Some purpose, other than tax avoidance, is required to consummate a trans-
action, and the regulations under section 368 take this requirement very seriously.
The regulations state that the provisions for corporate restructuring are concerned
with readjustments required by "business exigencies." 58 A transaction infused with
obvious tax-avoidance motivation may be disregarded by the Service as a sham
transaction, or may be recharacterized for tax purposes to better reflect its sub-
stance. The leading case on this subject is Gregory v. Helvering, 9 which established
that in order for a transaction to fall within a particular Code provision, the
requirements of the statute itself must be met and the transaction must possess an
independent business purpose.'
4. The Doctrine of Continuity of Interest
The continuity of interest doctrine first developed by the judiciary in an effort
to distinguish taxable sales frbm nontaxable exchanges. In Cortland Specialty
Company v. Commissioner6' and Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Company v. Com-
missioner,62 the courts were interpreting a newly enacted reorganization provision
that contained a parenthetical regarding the extension of reorganization treatment
to "merger-like" transactions.6 In these two cases, the taxpayers transferred sub-
in the acquiring corporation. This may cause the transaction to fail the continuity requirement, disqualifying it from
reorganization treatment, imposing immediate tax liability on all participating parties. The Proposed Regulations
change this result to the exact opposite. If adopted, the Proposed Regulations would remove the barrier to the post-
reorganization dispositions. However, if the transaction is a purported "B" reorganization, the "solely for voting
stock" requirement would not be met if the shareholders are considered to have received cash in exchange for their
stock in the target.
To illustrate: on January 1, 2000, parent purchases 21% of target's stock and furnishes cash as the
consideration for the exchange. On January 1 of the following year, the remaining 79% of target's stock is
exchanged solely for voting stock in parent. The corporations effectuate these transactions in a purported "B"
reorganization. In the above example, if the court combines the two transactions, parent will be treated as receiving
all of target's outstanding stock for voting stock as well as cash, failing the requirements of a "B" reorganization.
57. Underlying this judicially created doctrine is the requirement that corporate transactions be undertaken
with the objective of engaging in "business," and not avoiding taxation. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.
1934). Also, the acquiring corporation, to achieve reorganization, and hence, tax-deferred status, must continue the
target's historic business, or use a significant amount of the business assets of the target corporation after the
reorganization has been effectuated. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (declaring that for tax
purposes a transaction will not be given effect absent a purpose other than avoidance of tax).
58. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.368-1(b), (c) (1980) (elaborating on the business purpose requirement as it applies
to acquisitive reorganizations).
59. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
60. Id. at 469.
61. 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932); see id. (distinguishing corporate-level asset siles from corporate restruc-
turing and finding that the reorganization provisions presupposed a continuing interest in the transferred property).
62. 287 U.S. 462, 469-70 (1933); see id. (affirming the principle that the consideration furnished to the
target shareholders must represent an "interest in the affairs" of the acquirer).
63. I.R.C. §§ 202,203 (1926).
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stantially all of their assets to the acquiring corporation and received cash and some
short-term notes as the consideration for the exchange. Under the applicable Code
section, tax-free treatment was only available if, among other things, the con-
sideration received by the transferor(s) consisted of stock of the acquiring
corporation.' The courts concluded that because the consideration did not consist
of stock, the transaction did not uphold the general purpose of merger and con-
solidations by continuing the taxpayer's interest unliquidated.65 Because the
consideration received did not resemble the consideration required to be furnished
in mergers or consolidations under state law, the Courts held that the transaction
was not a reorganization for tax purposes." Thus, the continuity doctrine was estab-
lished. The Pinellas Court noted that to hold otherwise would render similar
transactions indistinguishable from typical sales, an unlikely endeavor of the
Legislature.
Unfortunately, the doctrine of continuity of interest has evolved erratically from
its rational inception;67 the relevant inquiry of the court regarding whether or not
continuity exists has shifted unpredictably over time.68 Initially, judicial scrutiny of
the nexus between the quantum of stock and non-stock consideration given by the
transferee to target shareholders to effectuate the merger dominated.69 In Grornan
v. Commissioner and Helvering v. Bashford7  the court explained that
64. See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 469-70 (analyzing the applicable Code provisions); Cortland, 60 F.2d at 939-
40 (establishing the principle behind the continuity of interest doctrine).
65. See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 469-72 (explaining the applicable Code provisions); Cortland, 60 F.2d at 939-
40 (examining the transaction in light of the continuity "requirement").
66. See Pinellas, 287 U.S. at 470 (disqualifying the transaction from reorganization status); Cortland, 60
F.2d at 940 (same).
67. See I.R.C. § 203 (1926) (containing requirements for tax-free treatment for the target).
68. See cases cited infra pp. 269-77.
69. When excessive non-stock consideration was conveyed, inquiry into permissible combinations of stock
and non-stock consideration received amounted to a quantitative analysis. For example, the United States Supreme
Court held that the interest in the acquiring corporation received by the target shareholders must be "definite and
material." See, eg., John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935) (holding that because the
consideration received consisted of 38% preferred stock in the acquiring corporation, continuity was satisfied). Cf.
Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1951) (finding insufficient interest where
less than one percent of the consideration received by the historic shareholders represented stock in the acquiring
corporation).
70. 302 U.S. 82 (1937).
71. 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
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Congressional intent to treat a reorganization as a continuation of the shareholders'
investment unliquidated required the imposition of a "remote continuity" test. 2
Compliance with the statutory corporate reorganization requirements alone, the
Court explained, is insufficient to warrant nonrecognition of gain upon an
acquisitive reorganization. 3 According to these decisions, the relationship between
the target corporation's shareholders' interest in the acquired corporation, relative
to the interest they receive in the acquiring corporation, must possess certain
characteristics to satisfy continuity.74 These foundational opinions stand for the
proposition that, in order for the tax-deferral provisions to apply, the historic
shareholders must ultimately retain an equity interest in the acquiring corporation
sufficient to show a "continuity" between the shareholders' original investment in
the target and their subsequent investment in the acquiring corporation.75 The
Code's corporate reorganization provisions have repeatedly been amended to com-
bat the restrictive interpretation of the "remote" continuity requirements in Groman
and Bashford.76
72. One aspect of the continuity of interest doctrine focuses on the "remoteness" or distance between the
former target shareholders and the assets of the target which were transferred to the acquiring corporation, hence
the term "remote continuity test." See Groman, 302 U.S. at 87-90 (failing the transaction on insufficient equity
interest grounds). In Groman, the target shareholders transferred their target stock to a newly-created subsidiary
of the parent. Id. In exchange, the shareholders received cash and stock in both the parent and subsidiary cor-
poration. After the transfer, the target was liquidated into the subsidiary. The Court held that to the extent the target
transferors received stock of the parent corporation, continuity did not exist. Id. To clarify, the percentage of
consideration representing stock in the parent was not taken into consideration to determine if the applicable
percentage of stock in the subsidiary (here, the acquiring) corporation requirement was satisfied. The facts of the
companion case, Bashford, differed only slightly. The initial transfer of target property was made by the target
shareholders to the parent but was subsequently transferred, pursuant to a single plan of reorganization, to the
parent's wholly-owned subsidiary. Bashford, 302 U.S. at 455-56. The court applied the holding in Groman and
disqualified the transaction from receiving nonrecognition status. Id. at 456-58.
73. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415,420 (1940) (holding that despite satisfying the literal language
of the statute, the transaction was not, in fact, a reorganization); see also Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co., 287 U.S.
at 469-70 (articulating that the interest in the purchasing corporation acquired by the transferor must be more than
a short-term interest to qualify as a tax-free reorganization under the Code).
74. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (reviewing these cases).
75. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text (synthesizing the early continuity of interest cases).
76. In 1954, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code § 368(a)(2)(c) and provided that a transfer to a
subsidiary of target stock or assets acquired through an "A" reorganization does not eliminate the potential for
reorganization treatment. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1954). Several Revenue Rulings were
reversed by statute in an attempt to clarify the validity of the Groman doctrine. Compare REV. RUL. 67-326 (1967-2
C.B. 143) (holding that a merger of target into the subsidiary in exchange for stock in the parent, or controlling,
corporation violated the continuity doctrine), with I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (1968) (providing that the transaction in
Revenue Ruling 67-326, a "forward triangular merger," qualifies as a reorganization). Congress amended I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(B) in 1964 to allow a parent corporation to transfer target stock to the parent's subsidiary subsequent
to reorganization without violating the doctrine. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1964). These amend-
ments went far to reduce the reach of Groman and Bashford, effectively overruling both decisions. Interestingly,
the formalistic interpretation of the "asset remoteness" aspect of the continuity doctrine survived and remained
viable, however, in circumstances not specifically altered by the amendments. For a detailed discussion of the
persistence of the Groman doctrine, see James A. Nitsche, "Asset Remoteness" Problems Persist in Affiliated
Group Acquisitive Reorganizations, 83 J. TAX'N 94 (1995).
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Thejudicial creation of an "equity interest" requirement, in the form of the con-
tinuity of interest requirement, raised fundamental questions that have been the
subject of widely disparate, even conflicting, resolution."7 Specifically, what
quantum of interest in the acquiring corporation would the historic shareholders be
required to hold? What qualities would the interest be required to possess? How
long will historic shareholders be required to hold the stock representing their
"equity interest?" Finally, of what import are pre- and post-reorganization dis-
positions of the "equity" stock? The disparate resolution, and added complexity,
78
of continuity requirements on corporate reorganizations have long been criticized
by tax practitioners.79
a. Judicial Focus-Quality and Quantity ofAcquired Interest
As noted above, to satisfy the continuity test the historic shareholders must
exchange their target stock for stock in the acquiring corporation sufficient to repre-
sent an equity interest in the acquirer.80 Several cases decided in 1935 exemplified
the Court's "quantum" focus.
In Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Company, t the Court added that the continuity
of interest requirement mandates that the shareholder's equity interest represent a
"substantial part" of the value of the target stock transferred. 2 In this case, all of the
assets of a target corporation were exchanged for common stock certificates and
cash; the Court held that despite the cash transferred, the stock certificates (more
than 50% of the consideration transferred) represented a substantial interest in the
purchasing corporation sufficient to satisfy the doctrine. 3
77. See cases cited supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text; see infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
78. The additional restrictions placed on reorganizations eventually became part of the Code itself. In 1933,
Congress passed a bill that specifically delineated six types of reorganizations. See I.R.C. § 368 (1934) (replacing
the judicial doctrine of continuity with a statutory mandate of shareholder continuity of interest).
79. See, eg., Bernard Wolfman, Comments on the Continuity of Interest Regulations, 74 TAX NOTEs 371,
371-72 (1997) (viewing the Proposed Regulations as a step toward eliminating ajudicial doctrine that has distorted
legal analysis of acquisitive transactions and resulted in expensive and uncertain litigation); see also Martin D.
Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAX L. REV. 177 (1983) (asserting that revision of the definitional
standards applied in reorganization cases will vastly improve this complex area of law that "makes [no] sense at
all").
80. See Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F2d 937, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1932 (underscoring the
importance of Congressional intent regarding the reorganization provisions and how imposition of a continuity
requirement furthers Legislative goals); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Company v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462,468-
70 (elucidating the original focus of the judicial continuity doctrine).
81. 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
82. See ihL at 385 (stating that "this interest must be definite and material; it must represent a substantial part
of the value of the thing transferred").
83. Id. at 386.
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Fifty percent stock consideration, however, is not an absolute. The Court found
continuity satisfied in John A. Nelson Company v. Helvering,' where 38% of the
consideration consisted of stock, and 62% was furnished in cash.85 This case repre-
sents the Service's position regarding the minimum quantum of stock consideration
that must be furnished when the transaction involves a substantial amount of cash
as well.
For advance ruling purposes, the Internal Revenue Service has stated that, when
focused on the quality and quantity of the interest received, the continuity require-
ment is satisfied if the consideration, when considered in the aggregate, consists of
50% stock in the acquiring corporation. 6 To clarify, if one or more target share-
holders' receive an aggregate stock interest in the acquirer equal to at least 50% of
the value of all of the acquirer's outstanding stock, continuity is satisfied.88
The quantum approach was further refined in LeTulle v. Scofield,89 the first case
to imbue the judicial doctrine with the requirement that, beyond representing a
"substantial," or "definite and material" interest, as explained in Minnesota Tea, the
interest must be proprietary.90 Based on the Court's holding, if the consideration
furnished to the target shareholder does not consist of some quantum of stock in the
acquiring corporation, the shareholders fail to obtain sufficient interest in the
acquirer to classify the transaction as a reorganization. 9' This case represented a
clear departure from merely interpreting vague language within the Code, and pro-
pelled an entirely new concept-the character of the interest acquired-into judicial
inquiry.
9 2
84. 296 U.S. 374 (1935).
85. Id at 376-77. Additionally, in Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F2d 332 (5th Cir.
1951), the court refused to find the requisite interest where less than 1% of the consideration consisted of acquirer
stock. Id. at 338.
86. RV. RUL. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114.
87. Because it is often inevitable that some shareholders will not agree to accept stock as consideration, the
Service has stated that it is not required that every target shareholder become a shareholder in the acquiring
corporation to satisfy the rule. See Reilly Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 189 E2d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 1951) (recognizing
that not all shareholders will desire to participate in the newly formed entity).
88. The Proposed Regulations state that the continuity requirement will be applied with regard to stock of
the corporation in control of the acquirer, or the merged corporation, depending upon the nature of the triangular
reorganization. See Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.368-1(e)(2); see also Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, § 3 (utilizing
the acquisition, by target shareholders, of 50% of the value of all outstanding acquirer stock in the aggregate
approach to extend reorganization treatment).
89. 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
90. See id. at 420-21 (holding that 100 year bonds do not represent requisite interest because such bonds
render the transferee a creditor, and not one with a "proprietary interest in the enterprise").
91. Id.
92. Indeed, even though the transaction in LeTulle satisfied the earlier "quantum" tests under Cortland and
Pinellas, and could have been effected under the statutory requirement of several state law provisions, the Court
held that the transaction failed to furnish the target shareholders acquiring corporation stock, and therefore could
not qualify as a tax-free reorganization. Previously, courts had held that if securities were received, sufficient
interest was retained. See Commissioner v. "tyng, 106 F.2d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1939) (citing several circuit court
holdings), rev'd, Helvering v. Buchsbaum, 308 U.S. 527 (1940).
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b. Judicial Focus-Temporality and Post-Reorganization
Dispositions
In Southwest Natural Gas Company v. Commissioner,93 the court required the
historic shareholders to retain the stock received following a tax-free transaction. a
The court in Southwest failed to state any requisite period of time that would satisfy
continuity, but noted the significance of target shareholders' pre-arranged plans or
arrangements to dispose of the stock received. 95 Thus, to satisfy the continuity
requirement under this inquiry, the shareholders must demonstrate that, at the time
the reorganization was effectuated, they had no plans to dispose of the stock interest
furnished as the consideration that qualified the transaction as a tax-free reorgani-
zation. In Revenue Ruling 66-23, the Internal Revenue Service stated that the
historic shareholders, as a group, must maintain an unrestricted, indefinite owner-
ship interest in the acquiring corporation.96 Resolution of the inquiry regarding the
temporality of the consideration received and post reorganization continuity is made
through application of the step transaction doctrine.
A determination of target shareholders' intent to dispose of the stock leads the
court to examine all of the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the dis-
position.97 For example, where the shareholders were granted an option to sell the
stock received, and did so immediately following the purported reorganization, the
court held the disposition failed the continuity requirement.98 The disqualification
precluded the transaction from qualifying as a reorganization." In Morgan Manu-
facturing Company v. Commissioner, t° the court held that the continuity of interest
requirement was not met when shareholders agreed to give up their stock interest
in the acquiring corporation in consideration for the acquiring corporation's repay-
ment of certain shareholders' debts.101
93. 189 E2d 332(5th Cir. 1951).
94. See id. at 334. Indeed, the court specified that the facts of every case presented must be examined to
determine whether or not a "substantial proprietary stake" in the new corporation was retained by the former target
shareholders, as well as whether such interest represented a significant portion of the entire consideration exchanged
in the transaction. Id.
95. Id. at 334-35.
96. REV. RUL. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67; see also REV. RtL. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 112 (concluding that five
years sufficed to indicate that the interest retained was, in fact, definite and substantial).
97. Muskegon Motor Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 134 E2d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1943).
98. Banner Mach. Co. v. Routzahn, 107 F.2d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 676 (1940).
99. Id.
100. 124 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1941).
101. See id. at 605 (disqualifying the transaction for failing to meet the continuity requirements).
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McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner'10 represents a recent case
where the unsettled guidelines and focus ofjudicial inquiry resulted in the establish-
ment of poor case law. This case involved McDonald's Restaurants' acquisition of
several restaurant corporations owned by a franchisee-target. Initially, McDonald's,
the parent-acquirer, offered their stock as consideration; the controlling target share-
holders rejected the tender offer because they wanted cash, not stock. 0 3 Eventually,
McDonald's was able to reach a compromise with the shareholders when the share-
holders agreed to accept McDonald's stock with the understanding that they would
be able to offer that stock for sale in a public offering planned three months after
the reorganization." McDonald's merged with the target, and six months later the
target shareholders disposed of nearly all of their stock in the acquiring cor-
poration. 105 McDonald's reported the transaction as a taxable sale. Interestingly, the
Internal Revenue Service claimed that the transaction should receive tax-free status.
The Service relied on several factors'06 in arriving at the conclusion that the
shareholders retained their interest long enough to satisfy continuity.t0 7 Specifically,
both prior to and contemporaneous with the reorganization, the taxpayer was not
contractually bound to dispose of the stock representing a proprietary interest in the
acquiring corporation. '° The Tax Court held that because the shareholders remained
at risk regarding the value of the acquiring corporation stock they received in the
transaction, the continuity of interest requirement was satisfied and the transaction
was a tax-free reorganization." On appeal, the Tax Court's decision was over-
ruled. 0 The Court of Appeals stated that under any version of the step transaction
test, McDonald's failed to satisfy the continuity test because at the time the
reorganization was entered into, the shareholders intended to dispose of the stock
representing their unliquidated interest in the acquiring corporation; the transaction
should therefore be treated as a taxable event."'
In contrast, in Penrod v. Commissioner,' 12 the target shareholders sold all of the
parent stock seven months after reorganization." 3 The Tax Court, however, found
102. 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. Id. at 522.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The relevant factors included: (1) At no time did the shareholders request cash; (2) a positive relationship
existed between McDonald's and the franchisee, sufficient to find the franchisee had no reason to terminate
professional dealings with McDonald's; and (3) there was written evidence that the target shareholder had no
intention to dispose of the stock received in the transaction. See id. at 523-24.
107. Id.
108. McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F2d 520,523-24 (7th Cir. 1982).
109. See McDonald's v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981) (reporting the Tax Court opinion, later reversed
at 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982)).
110. McDonald's Restaurants, 688 F.2d at 520.
111. Id. at 523.
112. 88 T.C. 1415 (1987).
113. Idt at 1419-21.
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that continuity was satisfied in this case because at the time of reorganization, the
shareholders intended to retain their stock; events after the reorganization gave rise
to their desire to sell, and the eventual decision to sell was not to be included in the
determination of continuity.
14
These cases represent the increased uncertainty regarding the interpretation of
corporate reorganizations. Under the principles set forth in these case holdings, the
post-acquisition conduct of target shareholders have the potential to determine the
tax consequences of corporate transactions for numerous entities. The results are
added complexity for taxpayers and, in the case of a publicly-held corporation with
large numbers of shareholders, unadministrability for the Internal Revenue
Service.1 5
I. J. E. SEAGRAM-IMPETUS FOR CHANGE
In 1995, the Tax Court decided J.E. Seagram v. Commissioner,'t6 a case which
turned on whether or not pre-reorganization disposition of the equity stock received
by the target shareholders disqualified the transaction from reorganization status.
The inquiry also involved the step transaction doctrine and led the court to conclude
that the transaction amounted to a single "plan of reorganization" and did not repre-
sent independent transactions. 17 Concluding that the steps taken by Seagram were
all part of an overall plan to effectuate a single result, the court held that the trans-
action satisfied the continuity requirements, much to the chagrin of the taxpayer,
who wanted a tax deduction for the loss sustained." s Conceptually, the Tax Court's
opinion in Seagram is not harmonious with the Internal Revenue Service's
published position regarding post-reorganization continuity of interest,1 9 and does
114. Id at 1434-39. In another case, Christian Estate v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1989-413 (1989), the Tax
Court held that the continuity of interest test was satisfied even though the stock received in a merger was sold as
part of a public offering four months after reorganization.
115. Ascertaining the intent of shareholders in a publicly-held corporation is not practical from an
administrative perspective. Attempting to track the desires of even a few individuals is generally impossible.
Individuals change their minds; they believe they will act in a particular way and later behave completely
inconsistently with their original intentions. Relying on "intent" as a litmus test for determining the tax
consequences of corporate reorganizations is imprecise.
116. 104 T.C.75 (1995).
117. Id. at 100-01.
118. Id. at 104-05. In a reversal of typical roles, the Internal Revenue Service was arguing for tax-free
treatment and the taxpayer wanted the transaction treated as taxable exchange (so he could deduct the loss
sustained). Perhaps the oddity of the position the parties' had taken led the court to examine the transaction more
closely.
119. See REv. RuL. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67.6 (stating that "unrestricted rights of ownership for a period of
time sufficient [to conclude] that such ownership is definite and substantial" will suffice, regardless of whether "the
shareholder is required... to dispose of the stock before the end of such period," and stating that "five years of
unrestricted rights of ownership" is sufficient to satisfy the continuity test); see also REV. RuL. 95-69, 1995-42
(finding that distribution of stock received in merger by non-liquidating partnership did not negatively impact
continuity).
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not provide a strong foundation for treating post- versus pre-reorganization dis-
positions differently for tax purposes.
A. The Factual Background
During the summer of 1981, after two competing tender offers of acquisition,
a subsidiary of DuPont Holdings, Incorporated (DuPont) owned 46% of the
outstanding stock in Conoco; J.E. Seagram owned 32%; and the general public held
22%.12 Conceding that it would never successfully acquire the Conoco corporation,
Seagram tendered its shares of Conoco to DuPont for DuPont stock worth signifi-
cantly less than the Conoco holdings.121 Conoco subsequently merged with
DuPont.122 Thereafter, Seagram exchanged its Conoco stock for DuPont's sub-
sidiary stock and attempted to claim a loss on the shares originally obtained in an
effort to acquire Conoco."2
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the loss and issued a deficiency for
the tax liability owed. 24 The Service argued that the entire transaction was a
reorganization under section 368."z Oddly enough, the Service was arguing for
classifying the transaction as tax-free, rather than taxable. Going even further, the
Service asserted that a continuity test that "includes third party transactions in target
stock" that are not attributable to the acquirer's plan of reorganization "does not
further Congress' purpose and should be rejected.' 26
Seagram, the taxpayer, argued that acts taken during the tender offer com-
petition between Seagram and Conoco were independent of one another and caused
the transaction to fail the continuity test.27 The taxpayer posited that the transaction
amounted to a taxable exchange, and that the loss realized should be recognized for
tax purposes.1 28 It also cited a variety of cases 29 in which the Service held that the
changes in stock ownership prior to reorganization were stepped together with the
eventual acquisition, resulting in a recognized sale.
The court distinguished the cases Seagram offered as precedent in two ways.
First, the court found that the cases were different because the consideration fur-
120. Seagram, 104 T.C. at 87-88.
121. Ia at 88.
122. Il at 89.
123. Id. at 89-90.
124. ld. at 90-91.
125. IaL at 91-92.
126. Seagram, 104 T.c. at 94-95.
127. Id. at 93.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 101-02 (listing the cases relied on by Seagram). See, e.g., Yoe Heating Corp. v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 168, 177-78 (1973) (holding that a transaction involving an acquiring corporation's purchase of 85% of
the target's stock for cash and the creation of a subsidiary to which the assets of the target were transferred in
exchange for subsidiary stock was a taxable sale).
279
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nished to the target shareholders in Seagram was cash, not stock or securities. 130
Second, as suggested by the Service, the court stated that the continuity requirement
was meant to distinguish sales by the target shareholders to the acquiring cor-
poration from continuing investment by the shareholders in a reorganized entity.'31
The court agreed with the Service and held that the parties fail or pass the
continuity test solely as a result of the consideration furnished in the exchange. A
disposition of the target stock prior to the reorganization does not effect continuity
provided that the consideration for the stock does not originate with the acquirer.132
B. Practical Implications
In redirecting the focus of continuity inquiry back to the Cortland and Pinellas
approach, the court made it clear that the result in cases focusing on target share-
holder conduct, while proper as an application of the step transaction doctrine, is
no longer precedent when the issue is continuity of interest. To clarify, whether or
not continuity exists sufficient to grant tax free status is to be determined solely by
examining the characteristics of the consideration received by the target share-
holders. Although the court established a workable guideline for determining
whether or not continuity is satisfied-if the proper consideration is furnished, and
the pre-reorganization disposition is not attributable to the acquirer, the transaction
qualifies as a reorganization-their decision has had greater impact on the world of
corporate reorganizations than simply redirecting the focus of ajudicial doctrine. 133
Holding that the pre-reorganization disposition of equity stock should not
impact the determination of continuity, the court has called into question the policy
rationale behind the relevancy of post-reorganization dispositions. If the focus of
continuity should be on the nature of the consideration given to effectuate an
acquisition, disposing of the equity stock after reorganization should not disqualify
the transaction from receiving nonrecognition treatment if the transaction cannot
otherwise be characterized as a sale.
It would be perplexing if judicial inquiry of post-reorganization continuity con-
tinues to focus on target shareholders' plans to dispose of the equity stock received,
as in the "temporality" cases,1M or the actual disposition of the equity stock, as in
the "disposition" cases, 35 given the opinion in Seagram. It makes little sense to
130. Seagram, I0 T.C. at 101.
131. Id at 103.
132. Id. But see id. at 103-04 (holding that changes of stock ownership of the target prior to reorganization
do not violate the continuity of shareholder interest test).
133. See Giibert D. Bloom, Taxpayers Have More Planning Flexibility in Reorganization After Seagram-If
It Survives, 82 J. TAx'N 334 (1995) (elaborating on the potential impact of the Seagram decision).
134. See cases cited supra pp. 276-78 (cogitating the "temporality" approach to dispositions of the equity
stock).
135. See cases cited supra pp. 276-78 (analyzing cases that focus on disposition of the equity stock post-
reorganization).
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disqualify a transaction from receiving reorganization treatment because a share-
holder intends to sell the acquiring corporation stock to another shareholder the day
after the reorganization, but to allow him to sell his stock to the same individual the
day before without negatively impacting the status of the transaction.
The potential for the illogical result noted above has recently been addressed
through the proposal of new Treasury Regulations. 136 The remainder of this
Comment will address the technical and practical impact the regulations have on
corporate reorganizations under section 368 of the Code.
I. THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS-SOME OBSERVATIONS REGARDING WHAT
HAS BEEN AND WHAT WILL BE
The Internal Revenue Service has published Proposed Regulations regarding
the relationship between the judicial doctrine of continuity of interest and post-
reorganization dispositions by target shareholders of the acquirer stock received
pursuant to a plan of reorganization. 3 7 These regulations provide that in certain
reorganizations, 138 stock transferred to qualified group members 139 will not
disqualify the transaction from tax-free reorganization treatment under Chapter C
of the Internal Revenue Code.140
A. The Regulatory Scheme
As explained in the regulations, if an acquiring corporation furnishes con-
sideration to the target shareholders which represents a sufficient proprietary
interest in operations of the acquirer, certain post-reorganization dispositions by the
former target shareholders of that equity interest will not be taken into consideration
for subsequent determination of the requisite continuity.Y14 Thus, the doctrine of
continuity of interest will be refocused on the mix of consideration issued by the
acquiring corporation rather than on what interest the target shareholders retain.
136. Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.368-1(b), -1(d), -(f).
137. It.
138. The Regulations, if adopted, will apply to transfers subsequent to successful "A," "B," "C," and "G"
reorganizations. See supra Part l.B (defining these reorganizations).
139. See Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.368-1(f)(1)(I) (incorporating § 1.368-1(d)(5)(iii) and defining "qualified
group" as at least one chain of corporations connected through specified stock ownership requirements of I.R.C.
§ 368(c) (1997)).
140. Id. § 1.368-1(f0)(1).
141. Id. § l.368.(f)()(I)-(ii) (declaring thatcontinuity is notviolated where there is a transfer orsuccessive
transfer of target stock or assets among members of the qualified group). Numerous positive comments regarding
the proposed revision have been noted. See 1997 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) 2, at G6 (labeling the proposal a
"significant step forward," a "sea change" in the corporate reorganization area) (quoting Mark Silverman with
Steptoe & Johnson, Washington and Lawrence Garrett, Arthur Andersen LLP, Washington).
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Practitioners have frequently suggested revision of the corporate reorganization
provisions or a limitation of the scope of continuity requirements. 42 Allowing tax-
payers to transfer assets or stock received following reorganization refocuses
analysis of continuity on the consideration received in corporate combination
transactions, shifting the inquiry away from the conduct of the historic shareholders
and toward the acquiring corporation. The Internal Revenue Service explained that
because the earlier reorganization provisions failed to specify the requisite
consideration to be furnished by the acquirer, the courts, to effectuate Congressional
intent and distinguish taxable from tax-deferred exchanges, found it necessary to
imbue these business transactions with equity interest requirements.143 The Service
noted that the circumstances surrounding the creation of the continuity of interest
doctrine did not involve post-reorganization transfers by the historic shareholders;
the cases giving rise to the requirement involved a mixture of stock and excessive
non-stock consideration. The Service emphasized that the proposed rules do not
expand the scope of business transactions that would qualify as reorganizations and
stated that all of the facts and circumstances surrounding corporation
reorganizations are proper subjects of analysis.'"4 However, the Regulations
themselves do not specify the necessary amount of equity stock that is required as
consideration. The failure to specify the requisite amount of consideration leaves
that issue either under the controlling precedent of the "quantum" line of cases
outlined previously, or subjects the issue to litigation for resolution.
B. The Sordid Past
As this Comment reveals, the legislative and judicial developments in the last
decade, and the policy vagaries of the continuity of interest doctrine itself, allow for
inconsistent, even illogical, results. The hotly debated decision in Seagram
regarding pre-reorganization dispositions and the historic shareholder concept have
focused attention on the validity of the continuity doctrine as a whole. From its
inception, the continuity doctrine was intended to focus solely on the nature of the
consideration furnished by the acquiring corporation, and not on what the target
shareholders did with the consideration post-merger. As long as the sale of the
acquiring corporation stock was to unrelated third parties, and not to a buyer, or a
buyer's affiliate, the sale should not defeat continuity. Indeed, the Congressional
142. See generally Peter L. Faber, Continuity of Interest and Business Enterprise: Is It 7ime To Bury Some
Sacred Cows?, 34 TAX LAW. 239 (1981) (advocating for a corporate tax environment without these stringent
judicial requirements); Robert A. Jacobs, Reorganizing the Reorganization Provisions, 35 TAX L. REV. 415 (1980)
(generally urging reform ofSubchapter C's reorganization provisions); Bernard Wolfman, "Continuity of Interest"
and the American Law Institute Study, 57 TAXES 840 (1979) (quantifying the results of a study regarding corporate
reorganizations).
143. See generally Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.368 (expounding the underlying principles regarding the continuity
requirements).
144. Id
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
debates surrounding adoption of the reorganization provisions reveal that Congress
was concerned with the nature of the property transferred by the acquired cor-
poration.145 The Legislature assumed that the consideration furnished would be
stock in the acquiring corporation, and nonrecognition was extended to those
individuals receiving qualified stock in exchange for stock. Because Congress did
not specify the quantum or quality of the consideration required to be furnished, the
courts were called upon to interpret the vague statutory language. Courts initially
relied upon the "continuity test" to help distinguish sales, or taxable events, from
non-sales, or reorganizations, in order to determine whether or not gain realized
should be recognized for tax purposes. 146 Accordingly, the cases laying the
foundation for the test were concerned with whether the nature of the consideration
furnished was consistent with the concept of a "reorganization," a tax-free
exchange, 47 and not with whether post-reorganization continuity existed.
Eventually, the courts began to examine dispositions of the continuity interest
postmerger. The language in some of these decisions makes clear that the courts felt
the continuity of interest test required some semblance of a continuing ownership
interest in the acquiring corporation after the merger had been effectuated, and did
not merely refer to the nature of the consideration furnished. Because this interpre-
tation is inconsistent with the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the
cooperate reorganization provisions themselves, its reliability is called into
question.
C. The Importance of McDonald's and Seagram
In the McDonald's case, the Tax Court found for the Service and held that the
transaction was a tax-free reorganization. 148 The court noted that the cases in which
the continuity of interest doctrine developed were not "helpful" because
examination of later dispositions, even if prearranged, should not destroy con-
tinuity.149 In the court's view, once the target shareholders acquire a sufficient
proprietary interest in the acquiring corporation, they should be free to dispose of
their shares irrespective of whether the disposition takes place prior to or after the
145. See 61 CONG. REC. 6550, 6561-569 (1921). For a good discussion of this early legislative history, see
Valentine Brookes, The Continuity of Interest Test in Reorganizations-A Blessing or a Curse?, 34 CAL. L. REV.
1(1946).
146. See supra Part ll.C.4 (cataloging the requirements of the continuity of interest doctrine).
147. In defining a "reorganization," section 203 of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, section 203(h), 43 Stat.
253 (1924), granted wide latitude for all types of changes in existing corporate structure. In Cortland Specialty Co.
v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937,940 (2d Cir. 1932), however, the court noted that the Legislature "[did] not abandon
the primary requisite that some continuity of interest on the part of the transferor corporation or its stockholders
exist in order to secure exemption. Reorganization presupposes continuance of business under modified corporate
forms" Id.
148. McDonald's. 688 F.2d at 532-33.
149. Id.
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merger' so Additionally, the court stated that "the Internal Revenue Service, the
commentators, and at least one court all agree that a post merger disposition, even
within a short interval, will not break continuity if the disposition is unrelated to the
merger."' ' The court held that the fact that the target shareholders intended to sell
their proprietary interest in the acquirer did not vitiate the discretionary nature of
such sale.152 Most importantly, the court's holding asserts that it is the province of
the Legislature, and not the Judiciary, to infuse a holding period requirement into
the corporate reorganization environment. 53 Unfortunately, the Tax Court's opinion
was reversed by the Seventh Circuit." Applying the step-transaction doctrine, and
collapsing several distinct acts into one, 55 the Court of Appeals noted that the target
shareholders had always intended to sell their acquiring corporation stock, and that
the merger would not have occurred unless the wishes of the target shareholders to
sell the acquirer's stock were accommodated.1
56
The Internal Revenue Service itself has offered little guidance on its views of
post-transaction continuity. Revenue Procedure 77-37, which states the Service's
general requirements for issuing advance rulings on reorganization validity, implies
that sales occurring during or after a reorganization that are not part of the overall
plan of reorganization will not be considered in determining continuity. 57 Different
results might be reached if the target shareholders are contractually bound to sell
their acquiring corporation stock prior to the merger, or if a pre-merger disposition
is made, to the acquiring corporation itself.
Several cases, involved pre-reorganization sales. All of these cases involved
sales of the acquirer stock that were included in the overall plan of reorganization. 58
150. See generally McDonald's, 688 F.2d 520.
151. McDonald's, 76 T.C. at 996-97.
152. Id. at 997 n.45; Id. at 998-99. The Tax Court surmised that they would have reached a different result
if there had been a definitive obligation at the time of reorganization to sell the acquirer stock. Id. at 999 n.52.
153. See generally McDonald's, 688 F.2d 520.
154. lid
155. While the court reached it decision formally through application of the step-transaction doctrine, the
court also considered various "additional considerations." McDonald's, 688 E2d at 527-28. Notably, the court
found the Commissioner's position regarding the corporation's tax liability objectionable since the Service had
already reaped the benefits of collecting taxes from the shareholders on the sale of the stock. Id.
156. Id. at 523-25. The court cited several factors that evidenced the intent of the shareholders to sell: The
overall relationship between the target shareholders and the acquirer, the rights to participate in a future public
offering of stock, and the determination of the shareholders to sell regardless of the profit or loss on sale. Id.
157. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, § 3.02. If the Proposed Regulations are adopted this Revenue
Procedure will be superseded.
158. See, eg., Kass v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 218 (1973). in which a corporation bought 84% of the target's
stock for cash and later absorbed the target in a statutory merger. Because of the absence of continuity of interest,
the Tax Court held that the parent's (i.e. the acquiring corporation) stockholdings did not contribute to continuity
because the holdings were acquired as part of the plan for eventual acquisition. In Yoc Heating Corp. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168 (1973), a corporation bought over 85% of a target corporation's stock for cash and later
caused the target to merge into one of the acquiring corporation's wholly owned subsidiaries. Id. at 168-69. The
court held that the merger and acquisition were part of an overall plan to acquire the target and the previously
acquired holdings could not be counted toward continuity. Id. at 171-78. In both of these cases, the cash purchase
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All of the dispositions were made to the acquiring corporation, or its affiliates. In
these cases, where the buyer reacquired its own stock, the requisite continuity did
not exist. However, despite the failure of the transactions in these cases to satisfy
the continuity test, the proposition that a sale to a third party will disqualify the
transaction from tax-free status does not follow.
The court faced the "third party scenario" in Seagram. While the reasoning of
the Seagram case"' is incompatible with the Seventh Circuit's result in
McDonald's,'6° the Seagram decision is more soundly based. Taking a functional
approach to the determination of continuity, the court queried whether the
disposition of the acquiring corporation stock received in the merger was part of the
overall plan of acquisition. In that case, although the cash purchases of stock
coincided with the acquisition, the court found that they were not part of the same
transaction for purposes of applying the continuity of interest test.161 The Service
argued successfully in Seagram that only purchases made "pursuant to the acquiring
corporation's plan of reorganization should count" when determining continuity. 62
The Service added that any formulation of the continuity test that includes
disposition of the acquiring corporation's stock to third parties does not further
Congressional intent and "should be rejected."163 The slight variance regarding the
time of sale should not be dispositive. Conditioning the result of tax litigation on
whether or not a shareholder sells the equity stock the day before, or the day after,
reorganization establishes an arbitrary and illogical basis for determining the tax
consequences to significant business transactions, and leaves little room for
effective tax planning.
Although the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that post-
reorganization sales of the acquiring corporation's stock by the acquired cor-
poration's shareholders defeat continuity if they were contemplated at the time of
the reorganization, the Service's position in Seagram seems to suggest that sales to
unrelated third parties do not defeat continuity if the acquiring corporation does not
facilitate them.164 Adopting the Service's position-a test that depends on
ascertaining human intent-will present huge administrative burdens regarding
implementation. Target shareholders may not divulge their true intent prior to
was part of an overall acquisition plan of the acquiring corporation, and combining the previous stock purchases
with the eventual acquisition seems more justified than in situations involving unrelated third parties.
159. In Seagram, the court held that pre-reorganization disposition of the stock representing a proprietary
interest in the acquiring corporation does not negatively impact the resolution of whether continuity existed at the
time of reorganization. Seagram, 104 T.C. at 99.
160. The continuity requirements were not met in McDonald's. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 523-24
(recounting that the formulation of the intent to dispose of the acquiring corporation stock prior to reorganization
precluded the transaction from qualifying as a tax-free reorganization).
161. Seagram, 104 T.C. at 102-03.
162. Brief for Internal Revenue Service at 97, J.E. Seagram, Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 75 (1995).
163. L
164. Seagram, 104 T.C. at 93-101.
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participating in a reorganization; still others may change their mind and refuse to
dispose of stock they previously planned to sell. 65 Hinging some target share-
holders' tax consequences of participating in a reorganization on the intentions of
other target shareholders presents additional difficulties.
D. The Proper Test
Because the Proposed Regulations do not effectively add much clarity to this
confusing area of the law, the substantive and procedural positions of the Service
require extensive examination. The primary function of the continuity of interest
doctrine should be limited to supplementing the statutory definitions of corporate
acquisitions that do not state an explicit quantum of stock consideration require-
ment. Thus, the doctrine should be expressly limited to sections 368(a)(1)(A) and
368(a)(1)(D) of the Code because these sections do not expressly enumerate the
type of consideration required. Hence, post-reorganization sales would generally not
implicate the continuity of interest doctrine, thereby avoiding the risk of dis-
qualifying the transaction from tax-free status.
In focusing exclusively on the consideration furnished, the Proposed Regu-
lations constrict the necessity of the step transaction doctrine as it applies to
continuity of interest, and provide the clarity necessary for target shareholders to
accept equity stock in a reorganization knowing that they are free to dispose of their
stock after the reorganization is concluded. Additionally, given the holding in
Seagram, target shareholders are free to sell their target stock prior to the
reorganization without impacting the status of the transaction for the other share-
holders or corporate entities involved.'6
1. Application of the Step Transaction Doctrine
The changes have been heralded as eliminating archaic legal strictures that
hinder the "business world in which reorganizations get done."1 67 In the future,
courts can apply the continuity test by focusing exclusively on the consideration
furnished by the acquiring corporation at the time of the reorganization. Only when
a question arises regarding whether or not a cash purchase or sale prior to the
reorganization destroys continuity should the court apply a modified step-
transaction test to determine if the sale can be attributed to the buyer. The proper
test for resolving this issue should clearly set a standard for determining whether,
at the time of reorganization, the transfer qualifies as a tax-free exchange. By
establishing a definitive position, the Internal Revenue Service can minimize the
165. See McDonald's, 76 T.C. at 998 n.43 (noting the inability of the court to discern a taxpayer's intent).
166. See supra Part I.B (opining the practical significance of the Seagram decision).
167. 1997 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) 2, at dl I (quoting Barry Isaacs of Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. California).
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potential for inconsistent resolution of tax cases and further Congressional intent
by extending tax-free status only if the transaction satisfies the underlying purposes
of nonrecognition.
The "end-result" and "interdependence" versions of the step-transaction
doctrine require the court to engage in the difficult, if not impossible, determination
of the taxpayer's subjective intent.16 Application of these versions has led to
inconsistent results; the uncertainty surrounding resolution of reorganization cases
renders a significant portion of corporate tax planning inefficacious.
The "binding commitment test,"169 however, is devoid of these complications.
Under this version of the step-transaction doctrine, the court objectively examines
the circumstances surrounding the transaction to determine whether an obligation
to sell the shares of acquirer stock received in the transaction existed prior to the
acquisition. If the obligation existed, the transaction is a taxable exchange. If no
such obligation existed, the transaction is a tax-free reorganization. When necessary
to resort to application of a test to determine this issue, the "binding commitment"
test provides taxpayers and tax planners the certainty they need to effectuate
necessary changes in corporate structure. Additionally, the objective nature of the
test poses no administrative burden. Ascertaining the true intent of the target
shareholders is unnecessary.
2. Examining the Characteristics of the Consideration Furnished
Outside of reorganizations accomplished under sections 368(a)(1)(A) and
368(a)(1)(D), judicial inquiry should be limited to the nature of the consideration
paid by an acquiring corporation in an acquisitive reorganization. The Proposed
Regulations eliminate several of the courts' previous methods to determine
continuity. If judges are to inquire about the consideration furnished, and not to
whom it was furnished, or how long it was retained, the holdings in several cases
utilizing such an approach are rendered meaningless. Additionally, redirecting
judicial inquiry toward the consideration furnished will put an end to the uncertain
and confusing interpretation of the Code's requirements regarding the non-
recognition of reorganizations.
Despite these positive changes, the Proposed Regulations do not specify the
quantum or quality of stock consideration required to effectuate a reorganization,
although the Regulations note that it is this consideration that must be examined to
168. See supra Part II.C.2 (describing the "end result" test as one that combines seemingly separate
transactions into a single transaction when the transactions are intrinsically related).
169. See supra Part lI.C.2 (stating the "interdependence" test as one where the court examines the various
transactions to determine whether they would have been inefficacious without all of the other steps taken to achieve
the final result).
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determine whether continuity is met. 170 The position of the drafters of the Proposed
Regulations regarding the consideration required for statutory mergers could, and
should, have been specified. But, much like the drafters of the 1954 Code, they
failed to address this concern. Continuity of interest was designed to effectuate
Congressional intent to defer taxation of illiquid corporate shares. The proposal, if
adopted, should be augmented with a quantitative requirement regarding the equity
consideration furnished in reorganizations effected under sections 368(a)(1)(A) and
368(a)(1)(D). These reorganizations, as noted above, do not expressly contain
quantum of stock requirements. 71 As such, neglecting to address these two
provisions expressly fails to clarify two widely used and important reorganization
schemes, and creates a fissure through which the judiciary may drive a new
doctrinal wedge.
Despite the indication that the courts will not drop below the 38% quantum
deemed acceptable in Nelson v. Helvering,'72 the Proposed Regulations should have
been accompanied by a quantitative requirement in order to avoid future incon-
sistent and vague decisions like those that have led this area of the law into the
abyss. For example, one practitioner advocates a requirement of 50% or 80% equity
consideration, and suggests that such a requirement is an appropriate trade-off for
allowing a target shareholder to do with the equity stock what he pleases post-
reorganization. 173 The Proposed Regulations, if adopted, could expressly require
that the consideration furnished by the acquiring corporation be no less than 30%
equity stock to satisfy what would remain of the continuity of interest doctrine. If
the consideration furnished is less than 30% equity stock, for purposes of a
368(a)(1)(A) or 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization, continuity is not present. Regardless
of the amount, establishment of a definite standard is necessary.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court's opinion in Seagram, establishing that certain dispositions of
target stock prior to reorganization do not effect continuity, and the Proposed Regu-
lations, that allow the prior target shareholders to dispose of their equity stock to
related parties, result in a reorganization environment in which the doctrine of con-
170. See generally Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.368-1(b), -(d)(5), -1(f) (narrowing the focus of inquiry to the
consideration furnished in the exchange).
171. See discussion supra Part II.B.1, 4.
172. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Nelson opinion).
173. See Lee A. Sheppard, Why Repeal Continuity of Shareholder Interest?, TAX NOTEs, Feb. 3, 1997, at 550
(explaining that the Proposed Regulations impose few, if any, restrictions on either consideration or disposition of
acquiring corporation stock). However, despite the fact that the Proposed Regulations are designed to minimize
confusion and instill greater certainty in the planning of reorganizations, mandating an "80% rule" in the context
of an"A" or "D" reorganization seems too harsh. The requirements in Revenue Procedure 77-37-that 50% of the
consideration be equity stock in the acquiring corporation-for purposes of receiving a letter ruling appear more
reasonable, but would require reconciliation with the decision in Nelson, where 38% was deemed sufficient.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
tinuity of interest is largely non-existent. Because target stockholders can actively
trade with third parties, those shareholders that wish to recognize gain or loss on
their stock holdings are free to do so without determining the tax consequences of
the transaction for the remaining shareholders that desire to continue their invest-
ment in the acquiring corporation. Additionally, the success of a corporate enter-
prise may depend in large part on proper structuring of assets and stock among its
related business entities. By permitting acquiring corporations to relocate acquired
assets or stock freely within their corporate group' 74 without affecting continuity,
the corporate officers' business acumen is respected. Efficient markets dictate that
where the success of an acquisition depends on the acquiring corporation's ability
to mobilize the benefits of acquiring another corporation, it should be permissible
to do so without triggering immediate tax liability.
174. See Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.368-1(f) (defining "controlled group" as a group consisting of one or more
chains of corporations connected through stock ownership with the issuing corporation).
VUNITED STATES
~POSAL SERVICE. Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation(RequIred by 39 U.S.C. 3685)
1. Publ'a n Tie h2- p No. 3. ". Date
McGeorge Law Review 0 3 10 1-18 115 7 4/10/98
4. ssue requency 5. No. of Issues Publihed 6. Annual Subscription Price
Quarterly A ualy 4 $20.00
7. Complete Maling Address of Known Office of Publicaton (Street Qy County State, andZP+4) (Not Pdnter)
McGeorge Law Review
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific
12017 Fifth Aven,,p. Sacrameto. CA 95R17
8. Complete MaIlfng Address of Headquarters or General BusIness Offle of Publher (Not Pdnter)
SAME
9. Full Names and Complet3 MaITIng Addresas of Publisher Ecitor. and ManagIng Ei tor (Do Not Leave Blank)
Publisher (Name and Complete Malhng Address)
Western Newspaper Publisher
537 E. Ohio Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Editor (Name and Complete Maing Addrass)
Editor in Chief 1997-98 Joshua Dickey
Address Same as 7
I!zagng Editor (Name and Complete MagngAddress)
Chief Managing Editor 1997-98: Christine Adams
Address Same as 7
10. Owner If ownedbya comporaton, Isn ame and address must be stated and also Immediately thereafter the names and addresses ofsto,-JholderJ owr'ng
orholding I percent ormore of the total amount ofstock It not owned bya corporeacn, the names andaddresses of the Indfvldua owner must be gen If
owned bya paruire."p or oher unhno rpatedlim Itr name and address as well as that of each InSWdurJ must be given If the pubflcatlan Is putfed
by nonprofitonjafmon, t name and address must be stated) (Do Not Leave BLank)
Full Name Comolete MaelIng Address
Univerisity of the Pacific 3200 Fifth Avenue, Sacramento CA 95817
11. Known BondoWlders, Mortgagees, and OtherSeculy Holders OwnIg or HoldIng I Percern or More ofTotri Amoumt of Bonds. Mortgageo, crOfher
Securiies. It none. check hem. 13 None
FutI Name rmslt tetlesnn Addr,.Le
12. For complaton by nonprofit organizations authorized to mall at speclal rates. The purpose. fimctlon. and nonprorit status of this orgeanzallon and the exampt
status for federal Income tax purposes. (Chec one) 3l Has Not Changed DurIng Preceding 12 Months
0 Has Changed During PrecedIng 12 Months
(It changed publisher must submIt esplafan of change with thIs statement)
Ps Form 3526, October 1994 (See Itruc ons on Reverse)
